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Black Candidates and Black Voters: Assessing the





Numerous studies show that the rate at which African-Americans cast ballots with missing or invalid
votes, i.e., the African-American residual vote rate, is higher than the corresponding white rate. While
existing literature argues that the plethora of African-American residual votes is caused by adminis-
trative problems or socioeconomic factors, we show using precinct-level data from two recent elec-
tions in Cook County, Illinois, that the African-American residual vote rate in electoral contests with
black candidates is less than half the rate in contests without black candidates. African Americans,
therefore, are able to reduce their residual vote rate when they wish to do so. We present comple-
mentary findings for white voters, whose residual vote rate often substantially increases in contests
which feature dominant black candidates.
Recent research on voting and elections demonstrates that African Americans
produce disproportionately more residual votes than whites. That is, the rate at
which ballots cast by blacks do not contain valid votes is higher than the corre-
sponding white rate (Brady et al. 2001; Herron and Sekhon 2003; Tomz and van
Houweling 2003; United States Commission on Civil Rights 2001). The white-
black residual vote rate gap is large, often greater than 10%; it is present regard-
less of voting technology, and it affects election outcomes. The case of Florida
during the 2000 Presidential Election is a prime example: if the black residual
vote rate there had been as low as the white rate, Albert Gore would now almost
certainly be president (Herron and Sekhon 2003).
The presence of a white-black gap in residual vote rates is not a new phe-
nomenon in American politics. Scholars have been aware of it since Price (1957,
73–75,77), and evidence of the gap can be found in Darcy and Schneider (1989),
Nichols and Strizek (1995), and Knack and Kropf (2003), among others.1
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1 We distinguish between residual vote rates and what is traditionally known as voter rolloff, the
phenomenon in which voters stop voting at some point on a ballot. Suggesting that voters systemat-
ically roll off in a given election implies that residual vote rates necessarily increase as one moves
down a ballot; our results show that this is not always the case.
The dominant explanation for this gap posits that residual votes reflect 
administrative shortcomings in polling places or socioeconomic problems like 
literacy limitations that disproportionately affect African Americans. All of the
major studies of the 2000 election rely on this explanation when evaluating the
performance of various voting technologies, and implicit in it is the presumption
that residual votes are nondiscretionary, which is to say they are mechanically
induced and devoid of political substance for individual voters (e.g., Brady et al.
2001; Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project 2001; United States Commission
on Civil Rights 2001). If political considerations are examined at all, only the
most general are considered such as competitiveness of a given electoral contest
(Brady et al. 2001; Crain, Leavens, and Abbot 1987) or its prominence (Dubois
1979).
A competing explanation for the relatively high black residual vote rate empha-
sizes discretionary behavior and posits that residual votes reflect intentional ballot
spoilage, abstention, and other types of deliberate actions. Although this expla-
nation has been around for many years (Kim and Koh 1972; Stiefbold 1965),
scholars have commonly ignored it. Nonetheless, this explanation is supported
by various exit polls and surveys which show that some voters participating in
general elections choose not to vote for president and that such abstention is more
common among blacks than whites (Knack and Kropf 2001; Tomz and van
Houweling 2003). Relatedly, there exists some evidence that African-American
ballot roll-off rates are lower when there are black candidates for whom they can
vote (Harris and Zipp 1999; Vanderleeuw and Utter 1993).
Given the literature on political participation, the dominance of mechanical
explanations for the white-black residual vote rate gap is surprising. No one
argues that purely mechanical features of elections account for high black voter
turnout in elections with overly racist white candidates (Bullock, Gaddie, and
Kuzenski 1995). Likewise, no one argues that purely mechanical features account
for the decline in white turnout rates when blacks are elected to Congress (Gay
2001).
We contend that studies of residual votes should incorporate the same sort of
substantive political considerations that dominate research on race and political
participation. If the meat of politics—feelings of efficacy, attitudes toward rep-
resentation, and so forth—affects turnout and other forms of voluntary political
activity, there is every reason to think that it may similarly affect the rate at which
individuals cast invalid votes.
Our objective is to examine the source of the white-black residual vote rate
gap and to assess whether discretionary behavior contributes to it. We add to
research on residual votes a demonstration that the black residual vote rate
decreases with the presence of black candidates and that the white residual vote
rate increases with the presence of a black candidate who is overwhelmingly
likely to win. Of the many electoral contests we analyze, the only ones with black
residual vote rates lower than white rates are contests with dominant black 
candidates.
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Nothing in our argument should be taken to suggest that voting technology,
voter experience, and socioeconomic variables are not important factors when
accounting for the high residual vote rates of African Americans. Indeed, we
usually find a significant white-black residual vote rate gap even when African
Americans can vote for major-party black candidates. However, because the
African-American residual vote rates we study dramatically decline in contests
with black candidates, we know that African-American voters are able to reduce
significantly their residual vote rates when they wish to do so. This reduction
occurs even when both administrative (e.g., voting technology) and socioeco-
nomic (e.g., education) factors remain constant.
In addition to our substantive contribution to the study of race and political
participation, we make two methodological contributions. First, we develop an
innovative research design that allows us to distinguish residual votes produced
by discretionary behavior from residual votes produced by administrative or
socioeconomic factors. Second, we contribute to the debate on ecological infer-
ence. We make clear when our estimates of white and black residual vote rates
are based on information contained in actual data and when they are based in
part on essentially unverifiable statistical assumptions. It is extremely rare for
users of ecological inference methods to report the extent to which their results
rely on such assumptions, and we believe that our reporting standards should
become the norm.
In the upcoming section we briefly review literature on race and participation.
We go on to discuss our research design, data, and statistical methods. Our empir-
ical results then follow, and we conclude with comments on racial polarization,
redistricting, and the study of residual votes.
Race, Participation, and Residual Votes
We argue that an individual’s decision to cast a valid vote in a given electoral
contest is, much like the turnout decision itself, driven by feelings of political
engagement and efficacy. For African Americans, these feelings reflect beliefs
about the extent to which blacks and black interests are represented in govern-
ment. Cole (1976), Morris (1984), and Guinier (1994) claim that black political
involvement and engagement increases when there is a possibility of black rep-
resentation or leadership. African Americans have strong preferences for descrip-
tive representation (Mansbridge 1999; Tate 2001) to the extent that they support
increased minority representation more than the principle of color blindness in
Congressional redistricting (Tate 2003).
Bobo and Gilliam (1990) show that African Americans who live in areas of
high political empowerment, as measured by control of the mayor’s office, are
more politically active than whites of similar socioeconomic status. Lublin and
Tate (1995) show that candidate race can positively affect voter turnout (black
and white) in mayoral elections. And using data from the 1996 Congressional
elections in Georgia (Bositis 1998; Voss and Lublin 2001) and Florida (Voss and
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Lublin 2001), scholars have found that black mobilization increases in districts
represented by African Americans.2
Questions on the 1993–1994 National Black Politics Study directly address the
importance of minority representation and black political involvement. For
instance, Dawson notes that 65% of African-Americans responded “no” when
asked whether “White officials elected from predominantly black communities
represent black interests just as well as black elected officials” (2001, 328). In
addition, Davis and Brown (2002) find that 17% of African Americans agree and
10% of African Americans strongly agree that “African Americans should always
vote for a black candidate.”
Although it is important to note that “most blacks believe that blacks better
represent blacks than whites and that no candidate deserves support just because
they are black” (Dawson 2001, 109; emphasis in original), we hypothesize that
on average African-American voters feel so strongly about electing black repre-
sentatives that they are more likely to cast discretionary residual votes in con-
tests which lack black candidates. If our conjecture is correct, the
African-American residual vote rate will shrink in contests with black candidates.
If, in contrast, socioeconomic and administrative factors alone explain why
African Americans cast residual votes, then the black residual vote rate will not
vary with the race of available candidates.
Research Design and Data
Our research design depends on examining a single election which meets three
constraints. First, the election must contain some contests with prominent black
candidates and others without. Second, both ballot format and voting technology
must be constant across voting precincts. And third, a significant subset of such
precincts must be racially segregated.
The first two constraints are required because we compare residual vote rates
across contests and precincts: we hold ballot format and voting technology con-
stant so these two variables cannot confound inferences based on comparing black
and white residual vote rates in contests with prominent black candidates with
black and white residual vote rates in contests without such candidates. Our racial
segregation requirement allows us to make reliable ecological inferences for at
least the subset of voting precincts which are segregated.
It is difficult to find elections that satisfy our three requirements. The striking
variance of voting technology (Brady et al. 2001) and ballot design (Niemi and
Herrnson 2003) across electoral jurisdictions makes it difficult to conduct cross-
county analyses of election results. While the Louisiana and South Carolina data
set used by Tomz and van Houweling (2003) contains validated turnout rates
2 Swain (1993) notes that the presence of black representatives sometimes reduces black turnout.
And Gay (2001) argues that the election of blacks to Congress only rarely increases political engage-
ment among African Americans.
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broken down by race, we cannot use it because our requirements of uniform
voting technology and ballot design are not met. And finding electoral jurisdic-
tions with a number of prominent African-American candidates on the ballot is
more difficult than one would hope.
With our constraints in mind, we focus on the 1998 general election in Cook
County, Illinois, the 1998 Cook County Democratic primary, and a set of 1998
U.S. House contests. These elections nicely satisfy our requirements.3 First, all
three of them had a number of separate contests, only some of which featured
prominent African-American candidates. Second, ballot format and voting tech-
nology were uniform throughout Cook County in 1998.4 Third, Cook County, the
second largest county in the United States, is both racially heterogeneous and
highly segregated.
Our analysis relies on election returns at the level of a precinct because
precincts are the smallest voting units in Cook County for which we can obtain
residual vote rates. This necessitates our having access to precinct racial demo-
graphics. The 2000 Census reports demographics by race for the precincts in
Cook County that existed in the year 2000, and we assume that these demo-
graphics were also valid in 1998. All of our calculations rely on a slightly abbre-
viated Cook County data set, and throughout this article we ignore absentee
voting.5
Methods
Ballot secrecy necessitates that we confront the difficult issue of ecological
inference, and for this we turn to two different ecological inference techniques.
The first, the method of bounds, depends on an accounting identity which does
not require statistical or behavioral assumptions. We use this method to make
inferences about black and white residual vote rates in racially homogeneous
areas of Cook County. Unfortunately, the method of bounds only leads to useful
inferences where there is a high degree of segregation. To make inferences about
black and white residual vote rates across the entire county, we use various sta-
tistical methods of ecological inference.
3 Illinois ended straight party voting in time for the 1998 elections. This means that our results 
are not confounded by the presence of a “party lever” that makes discretionary nonvoting a difficult
maneuver.
4 The entire county used Votomatic punch card machines. These machines neither prevented voters
from making errors when selecting candidates nor alerted them when they did so.
5 Cook County is comprised of the city of Chicago and 30 outlying townships. Our collection of
Chicago precincts is based on those wards in Chicago that had fixed boundaries between March, 1998
and April, 2000; there were 38 such wards. With respect to townships, the Cook County Clerk’s Office
publishes electronic maps that describe precisely where each township precinct is physically located.
For a 2000 precinct that corresponds exactly to a 1998 precinct it is straightforward to match census
racial demographics with 1998 residual vote rates. For township precincts that do not correspond in
this way, we aggregate 1998 precincts to 2000 precincts based on precinct area intersections.
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Logical Bounds and Inference from 
Racially Homogeneous Precincts
The method of bounds (Duncan and Davis 1953) is based on a simple account-
ing identity. For a given precinct, the minimum bound on the black residual vote
rate is the lowest possible such rate that is consistent with the number of blacks
and nonblacks in the precinct and the number of valid and invalid votes cast there.
The maximum bound and the bounds for whites are constructed analogously. The
true black residual vote rate must lie between the precinct’s minimum and
maximum bounds, inclusive, no matter what fraction of blacks and whites who
lived there are eligible to vote and no matter what fraction of these eligible voters
actually turned out to vote.
Consider Table 1A which describes electoral participation data from the U.S.
Senate contest in the 1998 Cook County general election. While each question
mark (“?”) in the table represents a quantity that is unknown, the observed
margins logically bound these entries. For example, because the number of whites
(2,521,584) in the county is greater than the number of voters (51,374 +
1,075,574 = 1,127,308), some Cook County whites must not have turned out to
vote in the 1998 election. The logical upper bound on white turnout in Cook
County is 1,127,308, and we can therefore say for certain and without any
assumptions that the white turnout rate was no greater than 1,127,308/2,521,584
= 45%. Similarly, the lower bound on the white turnout rate is 0% because
because the total number of nonwhites residing in Cook County (1,758,203)
exceeds the total number of voters.
These logical bounds (0% to 45%) at the level of Cook County as a whole are
wide and relatively uninformative. However, we observe the equivalent of Table
TABLE 1
The Ecological Inference Problem, 1998 General Election U.S. 
Senate Contest
A: For Cook County as a whole
Residual Votes Legal Votes Nonvoters
Blacks ? ? ? 988,946
Whites ? ? ? 2,521,584
Others ? ? ? 769,257
51,734 1,075,574 3,152,479
B: For Cook County precincts which are at least 99% Black
Residual Votes Legal Votes Nonvoters
Blacks ? ? ? 118,394
Whites ? ? ? 316
Others ? ? ? 569
2,457 36,786 80,036
1A for each precinct in the county. At the precinct level, the bounds are some-
times highly informative, especially in those precincts where there is marked seg-
regation. For example, a precinct may be defined as homogeneous black (white)
if at least 99% of its residents are black (white). If such a definition is applied to
Cook County, there are 135 homogeneous African-American precincts and 18
homogeneous white precincts. In the 1998 Cook County general election, the
former produced 39,243 ballots and the latter, 5,126.
Combining all of our homogeneous black precincts into a large aggregate unit
yields Table 1B. We know that the lower bound on the number of blacks in our
group of homogeneous black precincts who cast residual votes is 2,457 - (316 +
569) = 1,572; this is equivalent to a black residual vote rate of 1,572/(1,572 +
36,786) = 4.1%. Similarly, the maximum black residual vote rate is obtained when
blacks cast the maximum number of residual votes (2,457) and the minimum
number of valid votes (36,786 - 885 = 35,901) consistent with all of our infor-
mation; this rate is 2,457/(35,901 + 2,457) = 6.4%. Bounds for whites are cal-
culated analogously.
Statistical Models for Ecological Inference
Logical bounds on race-based residual vote rates are always valid, regardless
of their width. Nonetheless, the bounds tend to be useful only when analyzing
relatively homogeneous areas. Moreover, homogeneous areas may be politically
distinct from heterogeneous areas. To make ecological inferences about Cook
County in general, and to make sure that our results do not depend entirely on
idiosyncratic characteristics of homogeneous areas, we turn to statistical models.
There are a large number of reasonable statistical models we could use to esti-
mate county-wide white and black residual vote rates with precinct-level data,
and we have tried many of them to ensure that our results are not driven by a
single set of statistical assumptions. We have used Goodman’s regression (1953);
an extension of Goodman’s regression proposed by Achen and Shively (1995,
116–42) which relaxes the assumption that estimated parameters are mean-
independent of the proportion of blacks in a precinct; nonrobust versions of the
overdispersed logistic regression models in Wand et al. (2001) and Mebane and
Sekhon (forthcoming); Hansen’s (2003) multivariate beta-logistic regression; and
a first moments-based approximation to a multinomial-Dirichlet (AMD) model
proposed by Rosen et al. (2001). For our 1998 Cook County election returns, all
of these statistical models produce estimates of county-side black and white resid-
ual vote rates that are substantively the same.
We present results from the AMD model of Rosen et al. (2001) because it com-
bines deterministic information contained in precinct bounds with a coherent 
statistical model that is consistent with a number of plausible data-generating
processes. The Rosen et al. model is an extension of King, Rosen, and Tanner
(1999), who propose the first hierarchical Bayesian model for ecological infer-
ence. The King, Rosen, and Tanner model is itself noteworthy because it relaxes
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the single-cluster assumption of the ecological inference model in King (1997).
However, King, Rosen, and Tanner is limited to the case where the ecological
inference problem of interest can be expressed in a 2 ¥ 2 table—e.g., black vs.
white and voter vs. nonvoter. But as shown in Table 1, we face a 3 ¥ 3 problem.
Rosen et al.’s AMD model is thus useful for us because it allows inferences to be
made with arbitrary R ¥ C tables. Rosen et al. propose both a fully Bayesian hier-
archical model and a moments-based approximation which is estimated by non-
linear least squares. We use the latter, and it is outlined in the appendix.
1998 General Election in Cook County
The top seven races in the 1998 general election in Cook County were for
federal or statewide office and hence were voted on by all Cook County voters.
• Contest 1. The Bernardin Amendment, a (nonbinding) proposed state consti-
tutional amendment named after then Cardinal Joseph Bernardin. This amend-
ment called for universal health care coverage to be guaranteed in the Illinois
Constitution.6
• Contest 2. U.S. Senate; two main candidates, Carol Moseley-Braun (African
American) and Peter Fitzgerald (white).
• Contest 3. Illinois governor; no major-party African-American candidates.
• Contest 4. Illinois Attorney General; no major-party African-American 
candidates.
• Contest 5. Illinois Secretary of State; two main candidates, Jesse White
(African American) and A1 Salvi (white).
• Contest 6. Illinois Comptroller; no major-party African-American candidates.
• Contest 7. Illinois Treasurer; no major-party African-American candidates.
In these seven contests, there were two prominent African-American candi-
dates: Carol Moseley-Braun and Jesse White. We say that a candidate is promi-
nent if he or she is a major-party candidate. Moseley-Braun in 1998 was a
Democratic U.S. Senator who was running for reelection. Jesse White was the
Democratic candidate for Illinois Secretary of State.
Table 2 lists residual vote rates for the top seven contests in the 1998 Cook
County general election, and it is immediately evident from this table that con-
ventional wisdom on ballot “roll-off ” did not hold in this election. The Bernardin
Amendment notwithstanding, note how the Cook County residual vote rate
increased from Contest 2 to Contest 3, decreased between Contests 4 and 5, and
then increased again between Contests 5 and 6.
It is also evident from Table 2 that Contests 2 and 5—notably, the two races
with major-party African-American candidates—had lower residual vote rates
than the other top contests on the ballot. One might conjecture that these two
races were the closest among the seven. Perhaps, that is, low residual vote rates
6 See “Care Amendment Has Way To Go,” The Chicago Tribune, November 5, 1998.
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occur in very tight contests because, in such contests, voters are aware of the
increased importance of every single vote.
Table 3, which displays vote margins for the top seven races, refutes this con-
jecture. The closest contest of the seven was for Illinois Treasurer, and, paradox-
ically, this contest had the second largest residual vote rate among all seven
contests and the largest residual vote rate for a political office. The U.S. Senate
race (Contest 2) was close, having a margin of 2.9% between Fitzgerald and
Moseley-Braun, but the Secretary of State race (Contest 5) was not close at all,
having a margin of 13%.
The three initial columns of Table 4 display the mean residual vote rate
(“Mean”) in a collection of homogeneous black precincts, the lower bound
(“Min”) on this rate, and the corresponding upper bound (“Max”). Here we say
that a precinct is homogeneous black (white) if at least 99% of its residents are
black (white). The second three columns report analogous figures for the group-
ing of 18 homogeneous white precincts. In addition, the last six columns of Table
4 present results based on the AMD model as applied to all precincts in Cook
TABLE 2
Residual Vote Rates in Cook County, 1998 General Election
Contest Residual Vote Rate
1 Bernardin Amendment .5440
2 U.S. Senate .0459
3 Governor .0765
4 Att’y Gen’l .0730
5 Sec’y of State .0503
6 Comptroller .1020
7 Treasurer .1200
Note: Based on 1,127,308 ballots in 3,966 precincts.
TABLE 3
Vote Margins, 1998 General Election
Contest Winner Loser Margin Rank
1 Bernardin Amend. Yes .805 No .195 .61 7
2 U.S. Senate Peter Fitzgerald .503 Carol Moseley-Braun .474 .029 2
3 Governor George Ryan .51 Glenn Poshard .475 .035 3
4 Att’y Gen’l Jim Ryan .609 Miriam Santos .374 .235 6
5 Sec’y of State Jesse White .555 Al Salvi .425 .13 4
6 Comptroller Daniel Hynes .586 Chris Lauzen .396 .19 5
7 Treasurer Judy Topinka .5 Daniel McLaughlin .48 .02 1








Method of Bounds and Approximate Multinomial-Dirichlet Estimates for Black and White Residual Vote Rates, 
1998 General Election
Method of Bounds Approximate Multinomial-Dirichlet
Black White Black White
Contest Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI
1 Bernardin Amend. .722 .716 .739 .415 .406 .422 .697 .692 .703 .462 .458 .466
2 U.S. Senate .0626 .041 .0641 .0339 .019 .0345 .054 .052 .0558 .0332 .0322 .0343
3 Governor .135 .115 .138 .0377 .0228 .0382 .12 .116 .123 .0475 .0462 .0488
4 Att’y Gen’l .141 .121 .144 .0365 .0216 .037 .126 .121 .13 .0425 .0411 .0438
5 Sec’y of State .0653 .0437 .0668 .0312 .0162 .0317 .0564 .0539 .059 .0359 .0347 .037
6 Comptroller .143 .123 .146 .0655 .0511 .0666 .129 .125 .133 .0774 .0758 .0791
7 Treasurer .188 .17 .193 .0636 .0491 .0646 .171 .167 .176 .0834 .0815 .0852
Note: The Method of Bounds estimates are based on 39,243 ballots across 135 precincts which are at least 99% African American and on 5,126 ballots across
18 precincts which are at least 99% white. The Approximate Multinomial-Dirichlet estimates are based on all of the data: 1,127,308 ballots in 3,966 precincts.
Confidence intervals are obtained via bootstrapping.
164 Michael C. Herron and Jasjeet S. Sekhon
County, both homogeneous and heterogeneous. Of these latter six columns, the
first lists point estimates (“Mean”) of black residual vote rates for all of Cook
County and the second and third report 95% confidence intervals for these rates.
The final three AMD columns report analogous figures for whites.
The bounds and AMD results in Table 4 are quite similar, and this is despite
the fact that our bounds estimates are based on a highly selected subgroup of
Cook County precincts. One can see the similarity between the two different types
of estimates for both blacks and whites by comparing appropriate “Mean”
columns in the table. For instance, the AMD estimate for the black residual vote
rate in Contest 1 is 69.7%, and the bounds estimate is 72.2%.
There is some evidence that the bounds estimates in Table 4 are more extreme
than corresponding AMD estimates: the former are slightly lower than the latter.7
This suggests that the black voters in our homogeneous precincts—which are
among the poorest areas in Cook County—were somewhat less politically
engaged than those in heterogeneous precincts. This is consistent with Leighley
(2001, ch. 7), who finds a positive relationship between education levels and polit-
ical participation, and with Bledsoe et al. (1995), who show that blacks in non-
integrated neighborhoods exhibit more black solidarity than those in racially
mixed neighborhoods.
Even with Table 4’s mild discrepancies between bounds and AMD estimates
for black and white residual vote rates, the key similarity among the two sets of
estimates is their ordering across contests and their general magnitudes. Both sets
of estimates rank residual vote rates identically, and black and white residual vote
rate estimates are of similar magnitudes for all contests.
To avoid repetition, we focus on method of bounds estimates. We see that
residual vote rates for the Bernardin Amendment (Contest 1) were high for both
blacks and whites and that there is a sizable white-black gap: the black residual
vote rate of 72% is 30% larger than the white rate of 42%. But amendments may
be anomalous, and the Bernardin Amendment certainly lacks the competitive
nature of the races that follow it. The high residual vote rates for the Bernardin
amendment almost certainly reflect discretionary abstention.
Table 4 shows that black residual vote rates are lowest for the two contests with
prominent African-American candidates. For Contest 2 (U.S. Senate), in which
Carol Moseley-Braun was a candidate, the African-American residual vote rate
is 6.3%. The corresponding rate is 6.5% for Contest 5 (Illinois Secretary of State),
in which Jesse White was a candidate. The next lowest African-American resid-
ual vote rate is 13.5% in Contest 3. The black residual vote rates in Contests 4
and 6 are about 14%, and the corresponding rate for Contest 7 is almost 19%.
We know from the African-American residual vote rate in Contest 2 that about
94% of the African Americans who turned out to vote in the 1998 Cook County
general election were capable of casting valid votes. Thus, around half of the indi-
7 Table 4 suggests that one way to measure aggregation bias in ecological data is to compare results
based on homogeneous areas only with AMD results based on homogeneous and heterogeneous areas.
viduals who failed to cast a valid vote in Contest 3, and similarly for other con-
tests without black candidates, must have failed to do so because of some dis-
cretionary reason.
Table 4 shows that the maximum black residual vote rate in Contest 2 (and sim-
ilarly for Contest 5) is lower than the minimum black residual vote rate in con-
tests that lacked prominent African-American candidates. We see no such pattern
for whites. Although mean white residual vote rates for Contests 2 and 5 were
relatively low, these rates fall within the minimum-maximum white residual vote
rate intervals for other contests. One cannot conclude, based on our bounds, that
the white residual vote rates in Contests 2 and 5 were any lower than those in the
races for Illinois Governor or Attorney General.
Our bounds findings hold, but are less dramatic, even if we weaken our defi-
nition of “homogeneous precinct” down to 94%. Below this point, the black resid-
ual vote rate bounds for the gubernatorial race (Contest 3) overlap with bounds
for Contests 2 and 5. Except for Contest 3, our results based on bounds hold
down to a homogeneous cutoff level of 92%. Below 92%, there is so much racial
heterogeneity that the bounds become too large to support useful inferences.
The AMD estimates in Table 4 tell a story qualitatively identical to the bounds
discussion we offered above. Across Contests 1–7 there are dramatic differences
in the AMD estimates of county-wide black residual vote rates, black rates vary
significantly with the racial makeup of available candidates, and white rates 
do not so vary. Moreover, 95% confidence intervals for black residual rates for
Contests 2 and 5 are lower and do not overlap with the intervals of any of the
other contests.
1998 Democratic Primary in Chicago
We now consider whether our hypotheses about black and white residual vote
rates hold in the 1998 Cook County Democratic primary. We do not study the
1998 Republican primary because very few Republicans live in the heavily black
areas of Cook County. We focus here on Chicago only—as opposed to subur-
ban Cook County—because we do not have access to data on the number of
Democratic ballots cast per precinct in the latter.
In the 1998 Cook County Democratic primary, Carol Moseley-Braun ran unop-
posed for a U.S. Senate nomination. The Illinois Attorney General and Illinois
Comptroller races were also unopposed and neither had major-party African-
American candidates. Thus, the 1998 Cook County Democratic primary provides
us the opportunity to compare how blacks and whites participated in races that
were structurally similar insofar as having an unopposed candidate yet distinct
insofar as having candidates of different races.
There were seven major races in the 1998 Democratic primary:
• Contest 1. U.S. Senate; Carol Moseley-Braun (African American) ran 
unopposed.
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• Contest 2. Illinois Governor; six candidates with one African American, Roland
Burris.
• Contest 3. Illinois Lieutenant Governor; six nonblack candidates.
• Contest 4. Illinois Attorney General; Miriam Santos, not an African American,
ran unopposed.
• Contest 5. Illinois Secretary of State; two candidates, including Jesse White
(African American).
• Contest 6. Illinois Comptroller; Daniel Hynes, not an African American, ran
unopposed.
• Contest 7. Illinois Treasurer; two nonblack candidates
Table 5 displays residual vote rates for the seven top races in the 1998 Cook
County Democratic primary broken down, as in our general election analysis, by
racially homogeneous precincts. The black residual vote rates in these precincts
are based on 92,774 ballots across 495 precincts which are at least 97% African
American, and white rates are based on 2,192 ballots across 13 precincts which
are at least 97% white. A 97% cutoff is used here to define homogeneity instead
of our earlier 99% cutoff because in the primary there were fewer ballots to work
with—particularly fewer white Democratic primary ballots in homogeneous
white precincts.
Table 5 also presents results from AMD models which are based on Democ-
ratic primary results in all Chicago precincts. As before, bounds results and AMD
results are very similar, and to keep the presentation simple, we focus mainly on
the former.
Although black residual vote rate bounds overlap for Contests 1, 2, and 5, the
bounds for all three of these contests are substantially lower than the bounds for
the four contests which lacked black candidates. The largest maximum bound of
the three contests which had an African-American candidate is 16.3% and the
smallest minimum bound of the other four contests is 31.6%. The bounds also
confirm that the black residual vote rate was indeed lower than the white rate (and
by a substantial amount) for the uncontested U.S. Senate race.
In the Cook County Democratic primary, the lowest black residual vote rate—
either 11.7% or 11.9%, depending on whether one consults homogeneous
precincts only or AMD estimates, respectively—occurs in the battle for Illinois
governor (Contest 2), a contested race with one African-American candidate. The
second lowest black residual vote rate occurs in the U.S. Senate race (Contest 1),
where incumbent Carol Moseley-Braun ran unopposed. And, the third lowest rate
is for the contested Secretary of State race that featured Jesse White.
Note how the African-American residual vote rate varies across the three unop-
posed primary races: African Americans had a low residual vote rate of 13.1%
in the U.S. Senate race (Contest 1) where a black candidate ran unopposed, but
they had high residual vote rates in the two other uncontested races which did
not include black candidates (Contests 4 and 6). In these latter contests, the
African-American residual vote rates were enormous, 47.3% and 51.5%, respec-








Method of Bounds and Approximate Multinomial-Dirichlet Estimates for Black and White Residual Vote Rates, 
1998 Democratic Primary
Method of Bounds Approximate Multinomial-Dirichlet
Black White Black White
Contest Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI
1 U.S. Senate .131 .0562 .143 .553 .516 .599 .127 .12 .136 .473 .462 .483
2 Governor .117 .0408 .127 .0858 .00939 .0929 .119 .113 .126 .0763 .0685 .0845
3 Lt. Governor .37 .316 .402 .208 .141 .225 .367 .358 .375 .197 .184 .211
4 Att’y Gen’l .473 .428 .514 .365 .311 .395 .467 .457 .477 .345 .334 .356
5 Sec’y of State .15 .0765 .163 .134 .0613 .145 .145 .14 .15 .121 .111 .132
6 Comptroller .515 .473 .559 .399 .349 .433 .511 .501 .521 .389 .378 .402
7 Treasurer .403 .351 .438 .238 .174 .258 .402 .394 .409 .272 .26 .287
Note: The Method of Bounds estimates are based on 92,774 ballots across 495 precincts which are at least 97% African American and on 2,192 ballots across
13 precincts which are at least 97% white. The Approximate Multinomial-Dirichlet estimates are based on all of the data: 302,284 ballots in 1,860 precincts. Con-
fidence intervals are obtained via bootstrapping.
tively, according to our bounds estimates (or 46.7% and 51.5% according to the
AMD model).
Discretionary behavior is also evident among white voters: such individuals
dropped out of the unopposed Carol Moseley-Braun vote at a higher rate than
they did any other contest, unopposed or not. Indeed, and according to both
bounds results and AMD estimates, the white residual vote rate in the Moseley-
Braun race is actually greater than the African-American rate. In light of litera-
ture on race and residual votes, this is striking. If standard theories of voter
roll-off were applicable to the 1998 Cook County Democratic primary, then we
should observe more whites voting for Carol Moseley-Braun than for Miriam
Santos; yet, we observe the opposite. The logical conclusion here is that white
voters felt less engaged by a dominant African-American candidate than they did
by a dominant nonblack candidate (who in this cases happens to be Hispanic).
It is important to recall that the white residual vote rate was low in Carol
Moseley-Braun’s general election contest (only 3.4%, as in Table 4). But, of
course, the general election contest for a U.S. Senate Seat was closely contested.
We thus conclude that white voters have no compunction about participating in
meaningful elections that have African-American candidates, but they appear less
willing to participate in contests which have an unopposed African-American
candidate of whom they presumably do not approve.
The white-black residual vote gap was smallest in the U.S. Senate contest
where it was actually negative. As expected, it is also small in the gubernato-
rial and secretary of state contests, both of which included African-American 
candidates.
The method of bounds fails to support useful inferences if the definition of
homogeneous precinct is decreased below 63% for black voters or below 87.5%
for white voters. Given the data, where there is greater racial heterogeneity, we
must rely on statistical assumptions such as those of the AMD model.
1998 House Contests in Cook County
We now turn to an analysis of contests for the U.S. House of Representatives.
These appear on the eighth position of the 1998 General Election ballot in Cook
County. House contests are useful because they include some dominant African-
American candidates. There were no such candidates in the seven top races in
the 1998 general election.
There were 12 Illinois Congressional Districts that intersected Cook County
in 1998, and the three such contests with African-American candidates took place
in the 1st, 2nd, and 7th Districts. The 2nd District race, on which we elaborate
below, was contested by incumbent Jesse Jackson, Jr., a Republican challenger
Robert Gordon III, and Matthew Beauchamp, a Libertarian.
Table 6 displays bounds and AMD estimates for the 2nd District. A precinct
here is said to be racially homogeneous if at least 95% of its residents are of the
same race (the change from previous cutoffs reflects available data points). As








Method of Bounds and Approximate Multinomial-Dirichlet Estimates for Black and White Residual Vote Rates, 
2nd Congressional District, 1998 General Election
Method of Bounds Approximate Multinomial-Dirichlet
Black White Black White
Contest Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI
1 Bernardin Am. .669 .647 .712 .416 .365 .452 .657 .646 .667 .401 .381 .421
2 U.S. Senate .0487 0 .0519 .0321 0 .0349 .044 .0414 .0469 .0376 .0339 .0407
3 Governor .103 .0448 .109 .0438 0 .0476 .0947 .0913 .1 .0353 .0321 .0389
4 Att’y Gen’l .11 .052 .117 .0292 0 .0317 .101 .0961 .106 .0345 .031 .0376
5 Sec’y of State .0462 0 .0492 .0428 0 .0466 .0426 .04 .0457 .0409 .0372 .045
6 Comptroller .113 .0554 .12 .0594 0 .0646 .105 .101 .11 .0637 .0577 .0702
7 Treasurer .15 .0954 .16 .0701 0 .0762 .143 .135 .147 .0671 .0599 .0758
8 Congress .0872 .0282 .0928 .43 .381 .468 .0754 .0691 .0824 .137 .0898 .209
Note: The Method of Bounds estimates are based on 43,916 ballots across 127 precincts which are at least 95% African American and on 1,027 ballots across
three precincts which are at least 95% white. The Approximate Multinomial-Dirichlet estimates are based on all of the data: 105,633 ballots in 328 precincts.
before, our bounds estimates and AMD estimates are in general very close.
However, the bounds estimate (43%) for the white residual vote rate in Contest
8 is much higher than the corresponding AMD estimate (13.7%). While the AMD
confidence interval for the white residual vote rate has a fat upper tail (the 95%
confidence interval ranges up to 20%), it is nonetheless much lower than the
methods of bounds estimate.
Table 6 shows that, within the 2nd Congressional District, the African-
American residual vote rate in the U.S. House race (Contest 8) is the third lowest
of all top electoral contests from the 1998 Cook County general election—only
two other contests, both of which included prominent black candidates, had lower
residual vote rates. Bounds in Table 6 also show that the African-American resid-
ual vote rate for this congressional contest slightly overlapped (by 0.2%)  that for
the Illinois Governor contest. But apart from this very small deviation, the pattern
which we have observed before holds: there were relatively low African-
American residual vote rates in contests with prominent African-American 
candidates.
White residual vote rates in the 2nd Congressional District vary in a markedly
different fashion. Two contests have high rates: Contest 8 (the Jackson race) and
Contest 1 (the Bernardin Amendment). Table 6 shows that the true white resid-
ual vote rate in homogeneous white precincts lies between 38.1% and 46.8% for
Contest 8. Excluding the Bernardin Amendment, the next highest bound for the
white residual vote rate is only 7.62%, for the Illinois Treasurer contest!
For black voters, the method of bounds fails to support useful inferences if the
definition of homogeneous precinct is decreased below 95%. For white votes, we
are no longer able to make useful inferences if the definition is decreased below
91.2%.
The disjuncture between bounds and AMD estimates of the white residual vote
rate for Contest 8 is unusually high. This is probably the result of whites in homo-
geneous areas having unusually strong antiblack sentiments. Nonetheless, both
bounds and AMD estimates tell a similar substantive story: regardless of which
white residual vote rate estimate is consulted—and it is important to note that the
AMD estimate of 13.7% is more than twice the AMD estimated white residual
vote rate for any other electoral office—we know that white voters had a precipi-
tous uptick in their nonvote rate when pondering Contest 8, a race with a domi-
nant African-American candidate.
One might conjecture that whites cast an unusual number of residual votes in
the Jesse Jackson, Jr. contest because the contest was not at all close. We address
this possibility by examining winning margins and residual vote rates for the other
congressional contests.
Table 7 displays bounds estimates for all Congressional District races that
intersected this county, and Table 8 displays corresponding AMD estimates. The
former describes bounds only for Congressional Districts with a sufficient
number of racially homogeneous precincts. For Congressional Districts which
contain no homogeneous black precincts, bounds for the black residual vote rate
are of course uninformative.








Margins and Residual Vote Rates in U.S. House Races, Method of Bounds, 1998 General Election
Method of Bounds
Black White
District Black candidate Winner Proportion Ballots Mean Min Max Ballots Mean Min Max
1 Yes .871 91,805 .118 .0678 .124 3,951 .12 .044 .131
2 Yes .9 43,916 .0872 .0282 .0928 1,027 .43 .381 .468
3 No .725 609 .309 .256 .332 43,788 .063 0 .0688
4 No .817 583 .307
5 No .74 6,090 .131
6 No .673 19,646 .06
7 Yes .929 67,092 .14 .0759 .15 1,292 .34 .288 .366
8 No .686 12,538 .0555
9 No .746 14,088 .114
10 No 1 24,594 .178
11 No .588 1,343 .0715
13 No .61 20,355 .0934
Note: Winner proportions based on complete Congressional districts. The bounds estimates are based on residual vote rates based on precincts which are at
least 95% black or white. These are only informative for four Congressional Districts (1, 2, 3 and 7).
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According to Table 7, white voters had unusually high residual vote rates in
Contests 2, 4, 7, and 10. Table 8’s AMD results highlight the same four races.
And as before, AMD estimates are not as extreme as bounds estimates. Of these
four key contests, Contests 2 and 7 had dominant black candidates, Jesse Jackson,
Jr. and Danny Davis, respectively; Contest 4 had a dominant Hispanic candidate,
Luis Gutierrez; and Contest 10 had only one candidate, John Porter, who is white.
But the white residual vote rate for Contest 9 was low, even though the contest
was not at all close.
Black residual vote rates in Congressional races were lowest in Districts 1, 2,
7, and 11. All of these districts, except for the 11th, had prominent and dominant
African-American candidates.
Both Tables 7 and 8 imply that white voter political participation is often a
function of candidate race: when an African-American candidate is essentially
guaranteed to win an election, white voters often do not participate. We observed
the same phenomena in the Democratic primary in which white voters did not
participate in Carol Moseley-Braun’s uncontested U.S. Senate race. These find-
ings are consistent with Leighley and Vedlitz’s (1999) results showing decreased
white political participation during periods of perceived racial threat. Voss and
Lublin (2001) and Voss and Miller (2001), however, find little evidence of white
“backlash” against African-American candidates, and we find no such evidence
for the contest in District 1. Thus, white attitudes toward black candidates appear
to reflect contextual effects that vary by election.
TABLE 8
Residual Vote Rates in U.S. House Races, Approximate Multinomial-
Dirichlet estimates, 1998 General Election
Approximate Multinomial-Dirichlet
Black White
District Ballots Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI
1 128,369 .114 .109 .12 .0964 .0874 .107
2 105,633 .0754 .0691 .0824 .137 .0898 .209
3 113,166 .416 .279 .696 .0609 .0564 .0632
4 64,435 .302 .213 .466 .153 .118 .195
5 139,548 .723 .422 .904 .0957 .0878 .106
6 59,186 .792 .731 .841 .0571 .0508 .0697
7 147,200 .135 .126 .15 .212 .199 .238
8 61,685 .844 .828 .856 .0435 .0412 .0462
9 153,952 .163 .108 .259 .0844 .0671 .0968
10 88,314 .851 .767 .96 .191 .183 .206
11 25,336 .118 .101 .141 .0707 .0637 .078
13 42,031 .663 .585 .733 .826 .0708 .104
Note: Approximate Multinomial-Dirichlet estimates are based on all of the precincts in a given
district which are also in Cook County. See Table 7 for additional details.
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Conclusion
Our results on residual votes and discretionary behavior show that voters
decide whether to participate in an election separately for each contest on a ballot.
The turnout decision is not completed once a voter enters a polling booth, and
“roll-off ” is not a good characterization of what happens across electoral con-
tests. From a Downsian point of view, one could say that a rational abstention
choice is made for each office, amendment, and initiative that appears on a ballot.
The considerations that inform such choices reflect one of the main fault lines in
American politics: race.
The racial divide in American politics is so large that a significant number of
voters who spend the time and energy to go to the polls nevertheless cast dis-
cretionary nonvotes for important and competitive contests when there are no
candidates of their own race for whom they may vote. This finding is based on
real behavioral data and not post-election surveys.
The observed behavior of African-American voters highlights the extent to
which these voters value black represenatives.8 Majority-minority redistricting 
as currently implemented probably diminishes the substantive representation 
of African Americans (Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran 1996; Epstein and
O’Halloran 1999; cf. Lublin 1999; Swain 1993), but the behavior of both African
Americans and whites leads us to conclude that many voters would prefer to give
up some substantive representation in order to elect officials who look like them-
selves. These results are consistent with the public opinion evidence offered by
Tate (2003).
Research on election administration should not proceed as it mostly has done,
without taking even the grossest political features of elections into account. If the
decision to cast a residual vote is like the turnout decision, then ignoring salient
political variables when examining the quality of various voting technologies may
lead to erroneous inferences. Politically salient factors in addition to candidate
race, such as candidate gender, religious affiliation, and ideology, are likely deter-
minants of residual votes.
Many scholars and commentators argue that voting technology which prevents
or makes difficult the casting of residual votes should be adopted because it
shrinks the white-black residual vote rate gap and reduces the overall number of
residual votes. But since some voters truly do wish to cast a “none of the above”
vote, such technology can frustrate their wills. The obvious solution is to adopt
error-alerting voting technology and also allow for a “none of the above” option
on the ballot. The state of Nevada already affords voters this option, and it should
be more widespread.
8 We are agnostic as to why black voters prefer black candidates. For example, black voters may
have this preference because black candidates have distinct policy positions or it may be that black
candidates simply expend more effort mobilizing black voters by, among other things, spending more
time campaigning in black areas. A variety of factors are no doubt at work.
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Appendix: Moments-Based Multinomial-Dirichlet
The first moments-based nonlinear least squares model proposed in Rosen 
et al. (2001) approximates their fully Bayesian hierarchical multinomial-
Dirichlet model. The moments-based estimator is computationally much faster,
and its results are robust against some minor departures from the distributional
assumptions of the Bayesian model. We obtain standard errors via the percentile
bootstrap with 1000 replications.
We use the same notation as Rosen et al.; see Table A1. For a single precinct
i (i = i, . . . , p), we observe the fractions of people who turned out to vote for
specific parties (T1,i, . . . , TC,i) and the fractions of people of different races (X1,i,
. . . , XR,i). The unobserved quantities ( , r = 1, . . . , R, c = 1, . . . , C - 1) are
the fractions of people in racial group r who were of type c (nonvoters, legal
voters, or residual voters). Let = ( , . . . , ) be the numbers of people in
each voter type category. It is assumed that follows a multinomial distribution
with parameter vector qi = (q1,i, . . . , qC,i) and count Ni where qc,i equals 
Xr,i for c = 1, . . . , C, under the constraint that qc,i = 1. It is assumed that the
mean of is exp(gr,c + dr,cZi)/(1 + exp(gr,j + dr,cZi)), for r = 1, . . . , R, c =
1, . . . , C - 1 and i = 1, . . . , p, and where gr,c and dr,c are parameters and Zi is a
covariate.
The gr,c and dr,c are the parameters to be estimated. The quantities of interest—
the b terms—are functions of these estimated quantities. We have tried a number
of demographic covariates (such as proportion black and Hispanic), and 
none were found to be significant as judged by both Wald tests and bootstrap
goodness-of-fit tests based on the penalized least-squares fit.


















Notation for Precinct i in our 3 ¥ 3 Ecological Inference Problem
Residual Votes Legal Votes Nonvoters
Blacks 1 - X1,i
Whites 1 - X2,i
Others 1 - 1 -
T1,i T2,i 1 - c c iT=Â 12 ,
r r iX=Â 12 ,c ci=Â 12 3b ,b3 2,ib3 1,i
c c
i
=Â 12 2b ,b2 2,ib2 1,i
c c
i
=Â 12 1b ,b1 2,ib1 1,i
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